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Abstract 
 The migrant crisis continues to affect member states of the European Union (EU) and the 
EU itself as attempts to expand the membership of the EU have been repeatedly delayed.  
Scholars have previously examined other crises related to the EU and European integration, but 
scholars have not as of yet used these European integration theories to explain how the European 
migrant crisis affects the EU or the enlargement policy.  This paper addresses that deficit of 
scholarship by applying European integration theory to the migrant crisis in order to explain how 
the migrant crisis affects EU enlargement.  I argue that the migrant crisis increased the popularity 
of far right parties in the EU, which puts more pressure on the centrist governments to adopt 
more right wing policies including in terms of EU enlargement.  The research will use three 
different countries as case studies:  Austria, France, and Germany.  This concept that domestic 
politics, through the portrayal of the migrant crisis, are delaying or preventing EU enlargement 
raises the question of if the EU enlargement process must be reformed so that it is not used to 
score political points in domestic politics. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 The European Union (EU) stands as a beacon of hope for the world that nations can set 
aside their differences and work towards a common, peaceful future where everyone prospers.  
As it currently stands, the EU has the capacity to become a super power in the world because 
member states created shared institutions, including a common foreign and security policy.  The 
most powerful tool of foreign policy for the EU is the enlargement process wherein the EU 
admits a member state in the organization.  The enlargement process requires candidate countries 
to conform to a list of conditions laid out by the EU, which include conditions on democracy, 
civil society, economy, corruption, and others. 
 The Western Balkans, while not the only region that the EU is involved in, is a unique 
region for the foreign policy of the EU.  The Western Balkans include the countries of:  Albania, 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia.  Not only is the region 
another market for European goods and services, but EU foreign policy for the region also 
reflects a desire to prevent a repeat of the Yugoslav wars.  The EU attempts to prevent armed 
conflict in the region by both maintaining peacekeeping forces in Bosnia-Hercegovina and by 
offering all six countries the possibility of accession into the EU (Nadibaidze 2019, “EU 
Enlargement: The next Seven” 2014).  On the part of the six Western Balkan countries, EU 
accession offers numerous economic benefits, the most prominent being tariff free access to the 
European market.  Beyond the economic benefits, the EU also offers countries the possibility to 
become a part of a larger voice in the world, and a possible future without regional conflict. 
 Despite the promise of accession into the EU as a tool to promote peace in the Western 
Balkans and the current geopolitics of the region wherein other powers are attempting to exert 
influence in the region, the process itself has slowed in recent years.  Some countries in the 
Western Balkans have been waiting for over a decade to join the EU.  Countries such as Albania 
and North Macedonia continue to wait for even the chance of starting the accession process 
despite applying for membership in 2009 and 2004 respectively (“EU Enlargement: The next 
Seven” 2014).  Other countries in the Western Balkans have started the process, such as Serbia, 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro, but even optimistic hopes do not see those 
countries fully joining the EU until 2025.  There is little hope for the accession process to 
proceed without delay in the future because accession into the EU requires a unanimous decision 
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from every current member state of the EU to allow a country to begin the process, to continue 
the process after certain milestones, and at the end of the process. 
 The enlargement process occurs within eight official stages, the first step of accession is 
for the applicant country to submit an application to the member state that holds the rotating 
presidency of the Council of the European Union.  The second step occurs in the European 
Commission wherein the commission makes an internal evaluation of the country, which is 
submitted to the Council of the European Union.  After receiving the evaluation, the Council 
makes a decision of whether or not to accept the applicant and any additional conditions that the 
country may need to meet before accession negotiations.  The fourth step represents the opening 
of the accession negotiations which allows the Commission to identify any further shortcomings 
that would need to be addressed by the country in order to be in line with the acquis, the rights 
and obligations binding all member states.  The fifth step is the division of 35 chapters that 
makeup the acquis and what the applicant country would need to conform to for accession into 
the EU.  During this step, a single member state would be able to stop the accession process as 
each chapter needs to be opened and closed by a unanimous vote of the EU member states.  The 
sixth step occurs after all 35 chapters have been addressed by the applicant country and closed by 
the Council of the European Union.  The sixth step is when all of the member states sign the 
accession treaty and the EU institutions give their support to the treaty, which allows the 
applicant country to become an acceding country.  The seventh step requires each member state 
to ratify the accession treaty following their national laws on treaty ratification.  The last step is 
the acceding country becoming a member state on the date specified on the treaty (“EU 
Enlargement Factsheet 2014). 
 The delay of the accession process occurred even as a crisis transpired in which over one 
million people fled to Europe, some through the Western Balkans, in an attempt to find a better 
life in the EU and flee political or economic conditions in their home countries.  The migrant 
crisis began in 2011 as political upheaval in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia caused 
people to flee to Europe.  Different peoples joined the journey to the EU as the Arab Spring 
continued, with many Tunisians and Sub-Saharan Africans migrating during the unrest in Libya 
after the fall of Qaddafi.  In 2015 a surge occurred that was composed of more than 464,000 
Syrian migrants fleeing from the civil war in their home country.  In addition to the Syrian 
migrants, migrants from Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, and Sudan also 
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made the journey to Europe in large numbers during 2015 (Park 2015).  In total, the migrant 
crisis has seen approximately 1.8 million migrants come to Europe by the end of 2016.  This 
paper defines a migrant as a person fleeing over international borders to escape political 
violence, oppression, or civil war.  In the face of the migrant crisis, one might expect that the EU 
would fast track the accession process for the countries in the Western Balkans, which would 
allow the implementation of common policies that might be able to slow the movement of 
migrants, but this did not happen.  Instead member states delayed and prevented North 
Macedonia and Albania from even starting the accession process. 
 Given the timing of the migrant crisis and the slow down, and even the potential halt of 
the accession process in the Western Balkans, I wanted to explore whether there were any links 
between the migrant crisis and the delays in the accession process in the Western Balkans.  
Specifically, how has the migrant crisis affected EU enlargement? 
 I argue that the migrant crisis has increased the popularity of the far right parties in the 
EU, which puts more pressure on the centrist governments to respond to the perceived rise in 
popularity of the far right by adopting more right wing policies, including those policies focused 
on EU enlargement.  This approach to understanding the migrant crisis and its effects on EU 
enlargement is unique in the sense that other scholars have not explored the issue of the migrant 
crisis in conjunction with far right parties using EU integration theory. 
 In this paper, I introduce a comparative case study of the domestic politics of three EU 
member states:  Germany, France, and Austria.  In this comparative case analysis, I examine if 
and how the migrant crisis has affected the rise of the far right parties in the three case studies.  I 
then explore the policy positions of the Austrian Österreichische Volkspartei, the German 
Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, or the French La République En Marche to 
investigate how the parties have adjusted their platforms to entice voters from the far right 
parties examined in the three case studies.  Within the three case studies, I specifically 
investigate any possible shifts or changes in national policy or rhetoric related to EU 
enlargement. 
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
 By asking the question, how has the migrant crisis has affected EU enlargement, this 
paper combines two different literatures.  The first body of scholarly literature discusses the 
question of what factors cause EU integration.  The second body of scholarly literature discusses 
the question of how the European Union deals with the policy issue of migration. 
European Union Integration 
 European Union integration scholarship examines EU enlargement within different 
schools of thought that attempt to explain the motivations of European integration and those who 
hold the power during the integration process.  Scholars have attempted to answer the question 
that arises from the integration that the EU experienced since its formation, namely, what factors 
have caused EU integration?  In addressing the question, scholars have defined two over-arching 
schools of thought on EU integration and within these two, there are a further three schools of 
thought that explain the different motivations of integration within the EU. 
 The first over-arching school of thought is supranationalism.  This approach to the study 
of the EU emphasizes the autonomy of the European institutions from member states, especially 
in the decision-making process.  Within the idea of supranationalism, member states give their 
sovereignty to the institutions that make up the supranational organization, an organization that 
has power or influence above the national level of member states, in this case the EU.  When 
speaking in terms of integration, supranationalism argues that the motivations for integration 
begin within the supranational organization, directly opposing the idea that the member states 
have the impetus for causing integration (Jensen 2016).  Supranationalism also advocates for the 
supranational organization to be regarded for its transformative potential from an international 
organization into a new polity (Leuffen, Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2013). 
 The supranationalist school of thought encompasses several more defined and specific 
integration schools of thought that base their theory on the motivation and impetus of the 
integration stemming from the supranational organization.  Supranationalism encompasses many 
different schools of thought because of the broad range of objects studied within the theory, not 
limiting itself to one specific aspect (Leuffen, Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2013). 
 Senem Aydın Düzgit and Semin Suvarierol, in their work, “Turkish Accession and 
Defining the Boundaries of Nationalism and Supranationalism:  Discourses in the European 
Commission,” argue that the EU governs, integrates, and expands because of supranationalism 
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especially because for many of the supranational institutions it is their raison d’être.  The authors 
assert that since member states pool their sovereignty into the supranational organization, the 
worldview of the EU follows the belief that each state will work with each other for mutual 
benefit.  One of the most pronounced supranational institutions within the EU is the European 
Commission, which is supposed to represent the interests of the EU in its entirety.  The European 
Commission is a politically independent body from any of the member states and it functions as 
the executive body for the EU.  The authors further claim that since enlargement is one policy 
interest that falls under the purview of the Commission, the Commission is able to use the 
enlargement policy to expand and “promote supranational norms through the conditionality of 
membership and intensive contact with the candidate countries” (Düzgit and Suvarierol 2011 p. 
1).  Thus according to the authors, the enlargement policy is a self-enhancing tool of the 
Commission as a supranational institution because enlargement both embodies and perpetuates 
supranationalism (Düzgit and Suvarierol 2011). 
 Intergovernmentalism, the second over-arching school of thought, is the second approach 
to regional integration that draws from classical theories of international relations, realism and 
neo-realism most notably because of the focus on inter-state bargaining.  Intergovernmentalism 
is the perspective that regional integration occurs because of and through the member states, 
essentially viewing the states as the primary actors within the integration process.  In addition to 
the member states being the primary actors of the integration process, intergovernmentalism also 
sees member states maintain their sovereignty through a legal capacity that does not constrain 
national interests to external organizations (Cini 2016).  The influence of realism and neo-
realism occurs in intergovernmentalism’s focus on interstate bargaining and the establishment of 
interstate institutions to reduce the level of anarchy within the states system.  In the context of 
the EU, the intergovernmentalist school of thought also refers to the decision-making processes 
and mechanisms within the EU.  The processes and mechanisms specifically denote that 
decisions are made by the member states, without involvement of the supranational organization. 
(Cini 2016). 
 In practice, the intergovernmental school of thought is visible in institutions such as the 
European Council.  The Council provides an opportunity for member states to exert national 
power in the EU without seceding sovereignty to the EU and its supranational officials.  The 
Council represents a space where heads of state and government ministers represent their 
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countries in order to develop policy that has not or could not be developed within the EU 
Parliament.  While the Council did not originally meet as often as it does today, or have the 
purview it currently does, the Council transformed to meet more often and at a moment’s notice 
when needed, while also creating a similar space for the different cabinet ministers of the 
member states in the form of the Council of the European Union.  This intergovernmental 
integration occurred because of the trust and work that was put into the Council as an institution 
(Uwe 2014). 
 Within the intergovernmental school of thought, there are branches of thought that focus 
on issues such as economic ones that hope to further explain European integration.  These 
branches are present in the intergovernmentalist school of thought because intergovernmentalism 
does not attribute a specific reason to explain why states pursue integration beyond the desire to 
reduce the level of anarchy.  The different branches in turn address the specific reasons to pursue 
integration (Cini 2016). 
 The first two schools of thought are further delineated within three related schools of 
thought:  liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, and postfunctionalism.  Andrew 
Moravcsik pioneered the idea of liberal intergovernmentalism (LI), which is the belief that 
European integration was motivated by economic interests, instead of being driven by ideologies 
or geopolitical interests.  The other notable part of LI theory is that the member states are the 
actors that hold the power within the integration process, and that the process begins within the 
member states, not the supranational organization.  Moravcsik explores these ideas in his article, 
“Preferences and Power in the European Union,” published in the Journal of Common Market 
Studies (Moravcsik 1993). 
 Moravcsik contends that LI best explains the process of European integration by 
outlining the three stages by which LI theorizes integration occurs.  In the first stage, LI contends 
that states form underlying preferences that shape the opinion and policies of the government in 
power.  These underlying preferences are specifically formed by the subset of the social group 
that the state most directly relies upon to remain in power.  LI further contends, within the first 
stage that the preferences form around specific issues, most notably economic issues.  However, 
the issues that influence state decision-making do not need to be directly connected to an 
economic benefit.  Instead, the issues could indirectly influence the state through benefits to 
government spending, as an example (Moravcsik 2018). 
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 The second stage of LI explains that states can influence other states to make concrete 
agreements based upon the idea that all countries will gain from being a party to the agreement 
(Moravcsik 2018).  The theory of LI ends in a third stage wherein, after making the agreement, 
states pool and delegate power to a supranational organization, such as the European Union, 
along issue specific concerns.  Within the third stage of LI, there is a distinction in the manner in 
which the power is delegated to the EU by the member states.  The distinction in the third stage 
of LI is based upon the amount of power that has already been allocated to a specific entity 
within the supranational organization.  In some cases, where there has not been much co-
ordination beyond the establishment of a set of common norms, LI claims that the member states 
will create institutions within the EU to deal with the specific issues.  In the cases where there 
has already been substantial pooling of power, power continues to be pooled and distributed by 
the member states, but the states continue to treat the actors in the supranational institutions as 
agents working under the states (Moravcsik 2018). 
 When applied to the migrant crisis as an example, LI gives a viable reasoning that 
explains why there has not been increased intergovernmental coordination or integration.  Tanja 
A. Börzel and Thomas Risse argue that LI explains the stalemate and non-compliance of member 
states who previously had adhered to the rules and agreements surrounding migration.  The two 
specifically argue that asymmetrical positioning, in terms of which countries are more heavily 
affected, has weakened the power of some governments in the bargaining process.  This one-
sided bargaining has led to some agreements with regard to border security, but nothing that has 
been enforced that deals with refugee detention and dispersal among the different member states.  
The countries that have a large domestic opposition to migrants and refugees, which are also the 
ones not as heavily affected by the migrant crisis, thus have a stake in keeping negotiations at the 
intergovernmental level.  This self-serving interest is formed in order to both appease local 
political parties and to prevent the creation of another institution in the EU that would be able 
dictate the dispersal of migrants and refugees (Borzel and Risse 2018). 
 The second school of thought within the scholastic focus on European integration is the 
idea of neofunctionalism, first explained by Earns Haas.  Neofunctionalism falls under the school 
of thought of supranationalism as it theorizes that integration in a supranational organization, 
such as the EU, is driven by path-dependency and spillover.  The path-dependence aspect of the 
neofunctionalism school of thought is linked primarily to the continuing integration of the EU 
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because there has not been a devolution of power from the EU, only measures to stop or increase 
the integration.  The spillover aspect of this school of thought concentrates on how initial 
integration steps are often deficient, incomplete, and unstable because the integration reflects 
“the lowest-common denominator of national preferences rather than functional requirements” 
(Schimmelfennig 2017 p 5).  Despite the fact that initial integrations steps are not complete and 
stable, the initial steps require further steps to be taken that strengthen the institutions of the 
supranational organization (Schimmelfennig 2017). 
 In addition to the spillover and path-dependent aspects of the neofunctionalism, this 
school of thought also asserts that the integration process will begin with economic integration.  
The beginning stages of the integration will in turn allow political parties and interest groups to 
diversify and become loyal to the new supranational center because deeper economic integration 
will result in political integration to regulate the economic integration.  The political groups will 
become more loyal to the political center as they perceive that the supranational organization will 
better serve their interests, instead of the nation-state (MacMillan 2009). 
 Neofunctionalism can also be placed into the context of the enlargement policy of the 
EU, which Catherine Macmillan does in her article, “The Application of Neofunctionalism to the 
Enlargement Process:  The Case of Turkey.”  Macmillan uses a neofunctionalist approach to 
explain the enlargement process by highlighting the similarities present between the 
neofunctionalist background conditions and the Copenhagen Criteria.  The Copenhagen Criteria 
are a list of necessary reforms that prospective countries must conform to before they may even 
be considered for candidature.  Both the neofunctionalist background conditions and the 
Copenhagen Criteria emphasize the necessity for political stability founded on institutions that 
protect liberties and rights such as human rights, the rule of law, and a functioning democracy.  
Macmillan is able to further argue that the idea of “spillover,” which is important to 
neofunctionalist theory, presents itself once a country joins the EU because then the neighbors of 
the newest member state will desire to join the EU.  Macmillan finishes her article by giving an 
example of Turkey within the accession process in an attempt to show that the neofunctionalist 
argument can best explain the exhaustive process and what the future holds for Turkey.  The 
author concludes that the neofunctionalist spillover has helped Turkey in the accession process, 
but that the future itself is uncertain whether Turkey will continue the process or back out 
(Macmillan 2009). 
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 Furthermore, some scholars within the neofunctionalist school of thought, such as Frank 
Schimmelfennig, argue that integration under neofunctionalism relies on crises that arise from 
the integration process.  These crises cause further integration within the supranational body 
because governments seek to remain in control of the integration process and are reluctant to 
give more power to the supranational organization.  However, when a crisis occurs, the 
governments need to give more power to the supranational organization out of necessity 
(Schimmelfennig 2017). 
 Postfunctionalism, while also falling under the supranationalism umbrella, runs in direct 
contrast to the theory of neofunctionalism.  Whereas neofunctionalism attempts to address why 
integration is occurring in the EU, postfunctionalism concentrates on the disintegration of the 
EU.  Postfunctionalism, as defined by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks in “A Postfunctionalist 
Theory of European Integration:  From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus,” 
functions on the basis that European integration has politicized the issue of European integration 
within party politics because the issue has become more visible and divisive between two 
different identities, the national and the supranational.  The politicization of the issue has 
provided a space for Euro-sceptics within the party system to voice their opinions and gain a 
following.  Since European integration has become a divisive issue in national party politics, 
further European integration has become an issue of national politics within the member states 
(Hooghe and Marks 2008).  Since the issue becomes a national issue of both further European 
integration and national identity, national politics will undermine the efforts of those attempting 
to further European integration.  While the postfunctionalist school of thought attributes national 
politics as the reasoning behind the possible disintegration of the EU, this school of thought still 
falls under the supranationalism umbrella as the disintegration is initially motivated by European 
integration in the supranational body. 
 Frank Schimmelfennig echoes the point that domestic politics may undermine European 
integration and argues that national opposition may be especially strong within the context of 
crises.  In “European Integration (Theory) in Times of Crisis,” Schimmelfennig argues that 
during crises, postfunctionalism expects that politicization of European integration would 
constrain member states in the amount of bargaining that could be accomplished because of the 
domestic Euro-sceptic pressures.  Schimmelfennig provides an example of his postfunctional 
argument in the migrant crisis, which the author explains does not prove to be sufficient to call 
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for enhanced integration.  Instead, political parties in specific member states politicized the issue 
so that the member states were not able to find a common solution to the migrant crisis within 
the EU which resulted in a maintenance of the status quo in regards to the Dublin Regulations.  
The Dublin Regulations are EU law that requires asylum seekers to apply for asylum in the first 
member state they arrive in and they are not allowed to move onto another member state 
(Schimmelfennig 2017). 
 The different schools of thought pertaining to European integration offer contrasting 
views on the likelihood of European enlargement or disintegration, especially in light of the 
recent migrant crisis.  In the next section, I propose a theoretical framework that draws on 
aspects of postfunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, addressing how the migrant crisis 
has increased the popularity of the far right parties in the EU, which puts more pressure on the 
centrist governments to adopt more right wing policies, including opposition to EU enlargement. 
 
The European Union Policy on Migration 
 Since the migrant crisis began, interest in both national and EU related migration policy 
has increased.  Scholars have defined four schools of thought to explain how the EU addresses 
migration policy.  The first school of thought focuses on the idea of security and highlights the 
danger posed by the migrants.  In his book, The Politics of Insecurity, Jef Huysmans argues that 
EU migration policy has been formulated around the idea that the migrant is a danger.  The 
author first posits that migrants and asylum seekers have come to be construed as people who 
endanger the pre-existing communal identity and autonomy within Europe.  Huysmans finds that 
several of the policies, treaties, and conventions that make up European migration policy were 
created with the intent to prevent or reduce the number of migrants and asylum seekers.  The 
Dublin Regulations, for example, intended to reduce the number of asylum seekers by preventing 
asylum seekers from moving onto another EU member state if their application was denied in the 
first EU member state.  These EU policies indicate to the author that some of the European 
migration policy indirectly supports a need to protect European cultural identities from the 
“others,” embodied in migrants and asylum seekers, who would threaten the identity and internal 
stability of member states (Huysmans 2006). 
 A second school of thought argues that EU migration policy is based on a broad 
conception of economic citizenship rather than a narrow concern with threats to security.  In 
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contrast to Jef Huysmans’ argument that European migration policy was formed around the 
concept that the migrant is a danger, Andrew Geddes claims that EU migration policies were 
formed for economic reasons.  In his book The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, 
Geddes finds that the migration policy of the EU was created to form an “economic citizenship” 
that would complement the national citizenship that each European citizen had.  Geddes asserts 
that due to the EU’s beginnings as a “market-making” organization, the EU migration policy 
creates an “economic citizenship” that is based within the boundaries of the free movement zone 
or Schengen zone.  Geddes makes this claim by tying the idea of a European identity together 
with this “economic citizenship” since the EU is creating boundaries around its external borders.  
Thus, for Geddes, the European identity is essentially an “economic citizenship” indicative of the 
supranational aspects of the EU and its founding institutions, which focus on improving the 
economy of the member states and allowing economic goods to travel across borders (Geddes 
2005). 
 The third school of thought that addresses the question of how the EU handles migration 
policy focuses on the externalization of EU migration policy.  Natasja Reslow, in her article 
“‘Not Everything That Counts Can Be Counted’:  Assessing ‘Success’ of EU External Migration 
Policy,” finds that EU migration is shaped by external relationships that have been created 
through an active and formal dialogue between the EU and third countries in the form of a 
Mobility Partnerships.  The Mobility Partnership is one aspect of the external migration policy 
that directly trades one type of migration for another, the irregular migrant for the legal migrant.  
Reslow finds that in terms of “success,” the goals of the project are too vague in some 
circumstances to accurately understand how well they are fulfilled.  However what is worth 
noting is that the EU has entered into nine Mobility Partnerships with countries such as Belarus 
or Tunisia over the span of eight years, indicating that the EU could conclude that the Mobility 
Partnership has some positive aspects (Reslow 2017). 
 The fourth school of thought is similar to the externalization school of thought; however, 
this school of thought focuses on how member states of the EU have pursued their own 
individual policies despite surrendering that power to the EU.  Peter Slominski and Florian 
Trauner argue in their article, “How do Member States Return Unwanted Migrants?  The 
Strategic (Non-)Use of ‘Europe’ during the Migration Crisis,” that member states used the 
migrant crisis narrative to increase the resources they had available and to decrease the 
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constraints they were under in their efforts to return migrants.  The two authors claim that 
member states use the resources of the EU to support their national return operations and 
policies, which contravenes EU migration policy.  The authors then provide examples of how 
member states, such as Austria or Germany, have undermined the collective EU policy by 
making direct bilateral agreements on the issue of migration between the member state and a 
third country without the input of the EU.  In the case of Austria, the authors also contend that 
some member states have publically gone against EU policy by invoking emergencies powers 
that allow the government to reject and return asylum seekers to the border without regard of EU 
protocols (Slominski with Trauner 2017). 
 The different schools of thought offer a diverse number of understandings on the subject 
and various arguments explaining how the EU handles migration policy.  One school of thought, 
the security school, pertains to how the migrant crisis is affecting EU enlargement by 
emphasizing the idea that migrants are viewed as an “other” which results in European policies 
formulated on security against the migrants.  Thus, I will be using aspects of this school in my 
theory.  In the theory section, I will also address how national parties are dealing with the 
migrant crisis and policy while incorporating aspects of the security school of thought that deals 
with viewing migrants as a danger. 
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Chapter 3:  Theory 
 The migrant crisis has been an ongoing problem that different EU member states have 
experienced and dealt with in different manners according to the number of migrants each has 
received.  These different experiences have influenced domestic parties, especially the far right 
parties, to adopt policies in reaction to this migrant crisis that has led to more than 1.8 million 
people attempting to complete the journey to reach the safe shores of Europe (Kingsley 2018).  
While the migrant crisis might appear to only be a national issue given how the member states of 
the EU are affected by and pursue different policies on the migrant crisis, the issue has also 
become a supranational issue.  The migrant crisis has become a problem at the EU-level because 
the EU had already established protocols, the Dublin Regulations, to deal with limited numbers 
of refugees and asylum claims, and the EU has power over migration policy through EU border 
control and the Common European Asylum System as well.  In addition, once the enormous 
numbers of migrants traveling to Europe became apparent, the EU tried to establish a program 
wherein refugees that registered in the first EU member state they arrived in would be relocated 
to member states that had not been as heavily inundated with migrants (“Migrant crisis: 
Migration to Europe explained in seven charts” 2016).  Since the EU became more involved in 
the migrant crisis, the preferences of national leaders have changed within the European Council 
and the Council of the European Union on a number of issues.  In trying to understand how the 
migrant crisis has affected EU enlargement and why national leaders’ preferences have changed, 
I argue that the migrant crisis increased the popularity of far right parties in the EU, which puts 
more pressure on the centrist governments to adopt more right wing policies, including in terms 
of EU enlargement. 
 Far Right Political Parties (FRPs) oppose any form of expansion or enlargement of the 
EU because enlargement of the EU goes against everything that the FRPs stand for.  Parties like 
the Danish Dansk Folkeparti, or Sweden’s Sverigedemokraterna epitomize the far right in 
European politics.  These parties are characterized as nationalistic, anti-multiculturalist, and to 
some extent xenophobic, while they also campaign on slogans of law and order (Kopeček 2007).  
FRPs are nationalistic insofar as they attempt to promote their own concept of what is or is not 
part of the national identity in terms of religion and culture.  The FRPs also promote nationalism 
through their promotion of the nation-state, at the expense of other nations and organizations, 
such as the EU.  The nationalistic aspect of FRPs influence the EU enlargement process because 
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the FRPs campaign for the return of all sovereignty back to the individual nations.  By 
advocating for a reversion of powers and sovereignty to the individual countries, the FRPs 
oppose any action which would give the EU more power at the expense of the member states or 
any enlargement of the EU that would lessen the voice and power of their own country within 
the organization.  Enlargement is a particular problem for the FRPs because every member state 
that joins the EU is one more voice that dilutes the power of their own country in the EU 
framework that shares power equally among national leaders (Lubbers with Coenders 2017). 
 Euro-scepticism, for the use of this paper, is the term used to define the policy of 
opposition to the EU as a supranational organization and any actions that would strengthen it or 
its power in the world.  The FRPs adopt Euro-sceptic policies because these policies are 
representative of the broader anti-EU views of the far right’s base supporters.  Thus solely based 
on the Euro-scepticism that characterizes the policies of European FRPs, the parties would not be 
willing to accept EU enlargement in another region of Europe since the very expansion would 
represent the widening of the EU and its institutions that would be needed to integrate more 
people into the supranational organization. 
 In addition to the Euro-sceptic policies of the European FRPs, many of the parties can 
also be characterized as xenophobic and anti-multiculturalist.  The FRPs exhibit xenophobia, a 
dislike or fear of people from a different country, as used in this paper, by taking anti-
immigration stances and rhetoric that emphasizes a viewpoint that describes negative traits 
associated with specific nationalities.  By distinguishing between those who belong to a specific 
nationality and those who do not, xenophobia also engenders the creation of an “other” who can 
epitomize any person that does not belong.  The xenophobia present in the FRPs is often based 
on differences in religion or culture because many of the recent migrants who attempted the 
journey to Europe came from majority Muslim countries.  Figure 1 displays the different routes 
that the migrants took into the EU from January to July of 2015 as well as the numbers of 
migrants detected taking each route and the percentage of each nationality taking the different 
routes.  The xenophobic tendencies are present in the far right rhetoric about a Christian country 
or a Christian Europe when put in contrast with another religion, like Islam.  In the case of 
France, Le Front National has publically made the connection between immigration and militant 
Islam in the hopes of decreasing the government’s acceptance of immigrants.  Echoing these 
sentiments, other European FRPs made similar statements where some, like the leader of the 
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Dutch far right, Geert Wilders, desire to ban the Qur’an (Nowak with Branford 2017, Nossiter 
2015).  
Figure 1 
 Similar to xenophobia, anti-multiculturalism will be used in this paper to describe the 
desire to preserve the predominant culture within a country as opposed encouraging of different 
cultures to cohabitate in one country (Merriam-Webster 2019).  The anti-immigration stances 
exemplify the anti-multiculturalist tendencies of the FRPs, but the tendencies could also be 
present in any far right policy about EU enlargement.  Xenophobia, nationalism, and anti-
multiculturalism would be factors in any FRP opposition to EU enlargement because many of the 
candidate countries do not follow the predominant religions of Central and Western Europe, 
Protestantism and Catholicism.  Instead, these countries and regions either have a majority 
Orthodox Christian or Muslim population (Danforth with Allcock with Crampton 2019).  The 
fear of a migration of “Others,” an identity that the Balkans have come to be associated with in 
comparison to member states of the EU induces FRPs to oppose the enlargement process and 
affects domestic politics within EU member states. 
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 The xenophobic, nationalist and anti-multiculturalist policies of the FRPs have increased 
their political power, which is on the rise, with examples ranging from Sweden to France to the 
United Kingdom to regions of Germany.  Sweden, as one example, now has an FRP that is the 
third largest political party in the legislature.  Support for the party is still rising after the party 
was able to cross Sweden’s electoral threshold after the most recent national elections (Brown 
2018).  France has seen a rise in support for the far right as the French FRP, Front National, was 
able to garner over 10 million votes in the run-off for the presidential elections in May 2017 
between the Front National and a center-left party led by Emanuel Macron, La République en 
Marche (Aisch with Bloch, Lai, and Morenne 2017).  In the United Kingdom, the far right 
United Kingdom Independence Party successfully campaigned for the UK to leave the EU in the 
2016 referendum on Brexit (Parfitt 2016).  Regional elections in Germany have even shown that 
the FRPs are gaining ground in traditionally center-right strongholds like Bavaria, where the 
CSU lost its super-majority by gaining only 37 percent of the vote (“Massive Losses for 
Merkel’s Bavaria Ally” 2018). 
 The rise in popularity and power of the FRPs can be partly attributed to the migrant crisis 
that saw over one million people travel to Europe in 2015 alone.  As the migrant crisis continues, 
the local populace is exposed to people who do not share a similar culture, religion, or even 
language in many instances.  Citizens can see this divide as a threat to their cultural identity, 
especially when the migrants stay in the community.  Once the native citizens view the migrants 
as a threat to their cultural identity, the locals begin to support or more heavily support the FRP 
of the individual country because of the FRP rhetoric that they are the only party that can protect 
the national culture from the invaders.  One study surveyed Greek citizens during the migrant 
crisis and found that an increase by one percent of migrants led to five percent increase in 
support of the local FRP, Golden Dawn (Vasilakis 2017).  The migrant crisis, which is still an 
ongoing problem, also affects the rightward shift in the local populace because natives could 
become less welcoming to poor migrants in areas in which large numbers of migrants have 
already arrived.  However the arrival of large numbers of migrants is not necessary for the 
formulation of anti-migrant sentiments.  Thus, the continuing problem of the migrant crisis 
compounds the initial surge of migrants as many migrants continue to express a desire to finish 
their journeys in similar countries, such as Germany (Karreth et al. 2015, Torelli 2017). 
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 This paper characterizes centrist parties, such as the Conservative Party in the United 
Kingdom, the Danish Socialdemokraterne (Social Democratic Party) or the Partido Popular 
(People’s Party) in Spain, as centrist parties.  Centrist parties in Europe are typically the larger 
and traditional political parties that have governed some European nations for decades, often 
alternating between center left and center right.  One defining mark of a centrist party is its focus 
on capturing the vote of moderates, who traditionally constituted the bulk of the electorate, such 
center positions include a pro-EU integration position.  However, by taking a more centrist 
position, the mainstream parties opened political space for the growth of the FRPs, especially on 
issues of race relations and immigration (Kitschelt 1995). 
 Centrist parties, such as Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, have governed many 
European nations largely uninterrupted since end of the Second World War.  These parties have 
expanded their voter base so that they became the predominant parties on the left or the right of 
the political spectrum.  Due to the longevity of these centrist parties and the lack of viable 
challenges by other parties from the same side of the political spectrum, the centrist parties were 
not prepared for the opposition presented by the FRPs.  The FRPs have proven especially 
challenging for the centrist parties because they have challenged the centrist parties on socio-
cultural issues instead of the traditional socio-economic issues of the centrist parties (Mudde 
2010). 
 Traditional parties on both sides of the spectrum adopted pro-EU integration rhetoric and 
policies before the rise of the far right.  Centrist parties from across the political spectrum 
adopted pro-EU policies despite the differences of opinion on the economy, military, and 
government spending because pro-EU positions cannot be categorized by a left/right political 
cleavage.  Instead, the positions on EU integration transcend the cleavage, especially as citizens 
began to put more faith in international organizations, such as the EU or its predecessors (Dalton 
2006).  A pro-EU position transcends the traditional left/right cleavage because integration offers 
benefits, especially economic benefits, to the voting base of both parties. 
 While the FRPs may be opposed to EU enlargement, these parties are not in power within 
most EU member states even though some FRPs appear to be gaining power.  Instead, the far 
right exerts pressure on the centrist political parties within the EU to adopt or use similar policy 
platforms to those of the far right.  The centrist parties shift their policy platforms to the right in 
the hopes of gaining or remaining in power by enticing the supporters of the far right to vote for 
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the centrist parties.  Public opinion data or previous electoral outcomes are two forms of pressure 
that the FRPs exert on the centrist parties that could cause centrist parties to fear that the parties 
would not maintain the same level of power or even lose power at the expense of the far right 
(Han 2015, Abou-Chadi with Krause 2018).  The centrist parties adopt some of the policies of 
the far right both to exclude the far right party from becoming an influential part of the 
government and to have more votes comparatively than the competition (Abou-Chadi with 
Krause 2018, Han 2015).  Specifically, the FRPs influence the centrist policies on immigration 
and EU integration because those are the core policy issues of the far right, and the policies that 
base supporters of the far right care most about (Downes with Loveless 2018).  Between the two 
sides of the political spectrum, center right parties would be more likely to adapt their positions 
from the far right than center left parties in Europe because of a voter base that could identify 
more easily with the policies of the far right.  Nevertheless, given enough incentive, in terms of 
loss of voters and potential loss of political power, all types of centrist parties could shift their 
policy platforms and rhetoric to parrot the FRPs (Han 2015). 
 In the case of European expansion in the face of the migrant crisis, the centrist parties 
may be more willing to oppose EU enlargement at the national level.  While the centrist parties 
may contain some strong supporters of the EU and EU integration, regardless of political 
pressure from events like the migrant crisis, the parties as a whole will be forced to decide what 
is more politically expedient.  The two options open to the parties are to either parrot the policy 
platforms of the far right and risk losing voters to the party whose policy is not shifted to the 
right, or to support EU enlargement and risk losing voters to the parties which campaign on 
policies of Euro-scepticism, which include FRPs.  Given this choice, centrist parties could decide 
to adapt the platform of the far right if the centrist party is already adapting some of the other 
policies of the far right in regards to Euro-scepticism or multiculturalism. 
 Centrist parties in Europe adopt policies on multiculturalism and immigration that 
emulate FRP platforms in an effort to exclude the FRP from becoming a substantive political 
power within the national legislature.  Centrist parties may follow an exclusionary strategy, not 
only for the overall goal of minimizing the power of the far right in government, but also for the 
centrist parties to maintain power at the expense of the FRP.  The strategy is self-serving for the 
centrists because the FRPs gain votes and power at the expense of the centrist parties as the 
issues raised and addressed by the FRPs could persuade the supporters of the centrist parties to 
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support the FRP (Han 2015).  The centrist parties can attempt to exclude the far right by 
preventing the far right from surpassing the electoral thresholds that some European nations, 
such as Germany, enforce for political parties.  This strategy requires the centrists to both attract 
voters from the far right, as well as prevent defections from the voter base of their own party.  To 
attract the supporters of the far right, the centrists could adopt the policies of the far right and use 
the centrists’ credentials as an established party that the populace is familiar with and that has 
governing experience (van Spanje with de Graaf 2018).  For the countries that do not have 
electoral thresholds, the centrists can still try to attract the votes of FRPs with similar strategies 
in order to prevent the FRP from gaining enough votes that their support becomes crucial for the 
ruling party.  Through the exclusion strategy, the far right influences the centrist parties by 
necessitating that the centrists emulate certain far right policies in the hopes of preventing the far 
right from gaining power in elections due to those adapted policies, especially in the case of the 
migrant crisis. 
 In addition to the influence exerted on the centrists by the far right through the exclusion 
strategy, if they are applied, the far right also influences the centrist parties through electoral 
competitions when the largest rival for the centrist party is adamantly pro-EU.  This other option 
for the centrist parties takes the form of the party shifting its policies to the right, not to attract 
the votes of the far right, but so that a coalition government could be formed with the far right 
after the electoral competition (Downes with Loveless 2018).  The coalition option is contingent 
upon the centrist party under-achieving in terms of the necessary representation in the national 
legislature, which would mean that it could not govern as a single party.  Once the coalition 
option is available, it becomes more likely that the center party would form a coalition 
government with the FRP if it has the necessary representation because it is politically expedient 
to enter coalition with one party rather than a number of smaller parties.  The coalition option 
shows how the far right is able to influence the centrist parties in Europe.  While the coalition 
option is a possibility for all types of centrist parties, the center-right would more likely form a 
coalition with an FRP than a center-left party because the center-right and the FRP would have 
policies that are more similar.  The centrist parties could only take the coalition option or the 
exclusion strategy before or during electoral competitions with the goal of the centrists gaining 
or keeping power. 
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 Given the rise in power and popularity of the FRPs, partly because of the migrant crisis, 
centrist parties have an incentive to pursue or even emulate policies of the far right in order to 
gain or remain in power; I therefore expect centrist parties to oppose or delay EU enlargement, 
either through rhetoric or through direct action.  Centrist European governments could halt EU 
enlargement by preventing nations from beginning the process, or by halting the accession 
process if it has already begun by using the veto power that each member state holds within the 
enlargement decision-making process.  Centrist European governments could also delay the 
process by promoting alternative options to enlargement such as the EU-Eastern partnership. 
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Chapter 4:  Research Design 
 As stated above, I argue that the migrant crisis has increased the popularity of the far 
right parties in the EU, which puts more pressure on the centrist governments to adopt more right 
wing policies including in terms of EU enlargement.  In order to establish the links between the 
migrant crisis, FRP politics, centrist party politics, and opposition or delay to EU enlargement, I 
used qualitative methods.  The data I collected includes secondary scholarship as well as primary 
documents, including party manifestos, newspaper articles, and other recorded statements from 
party leaders and members.  I also used existing data from surveys in the form of 
Eurobarometers to explore public opinion in Europe during specific times.  I then used the data 
to complete a comparative case study using different EU member states and their individual 
domestic politics within the case studies to ascertain the influence that FRPs exert on centrist 
parties regarding the policy issue of EU enlargement. 
 The EU enlargement process partially occurs at the supranational level where only heads 
of state or government make the important decisions, instead of a national government as a 
whole, but the of national leaders decisions are reflective of domestic issues and politics in the 
individual member states.  The migrant crisis must also be taken into account to better 
understand the politics that are occurring at the national and supranational levels.  How is the 
migrant crisis affecting EU enlargement? 
 While this paper argues that the migrant crisis caused the FRPs to gain support and 
popularity, prompting centrist parties to parrot the FRPs’ oppositions to EU enlargement, there 
are other possible perspectives on the effect of the migrant crisis on support for EU enlargement.  
One alternative perspective agrees that the migrant crisis still caused the FRPs to gain support 
and popularity, but argues that this increase in support does not reduce support for EU 
enlargement because the enlargement promises to strengthen national economies.  A second 
alternative perspective posits that the migrant crisis simply does not affect EU enlargement.  
Instead, the rhetoric and decisions against EU enlargement, especially in places such as the 
Western Balkans, have been the results of other events and public opinion shifts. 
 The three case studies that I have examined to answer this question and test the theory of 
this paper are Austria, France, and Germany.  These three countries have each had a centrist 
government in power during the migrant crisis and the governments have taken well-defined 
stances on further EU enlargement.  Austria is an important case in my paper because it is the 
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only case in which the centrist government in power, the Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian 
People’s Party or ÖVP), is in a coalition with the Austrian FRP, the Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria or FPÖ).  In addition, Austria has been a transit country 
during the migrant crisis with most of the migrants going to Germany passing through Austria.  
In the run-up to the 2017 legislative elections, the leader of the ÖVP, Sebastian Kurz, spoke out 
against the migrant crisis and the need to take a tougher stance on the migrant issue from a 
national and supranational perspective (Traill 2017). 
 France is an important case to contrast with both Austria and Germany as France, which 
currently has a centrist government in power, has not been as heavily affected by the migrat 
crisis as the other two case studies in this paper.  The centrist La République En Marche! Party 
(The Republic in Motion or LREM), led by President Emmanuel Macron, is pro-EU and a 
center-left party.  As a center-left party leads France, the French case offers a different 
perspective of party politics as center-right parties lead the other two countries.  France also 
offers a different perspective from the other two cases because the LREM is a relatively new 
party, unlike the centrist parties of the other two cases.  In addition to the uniqueness of the case, 
some of the policy positions of LREM have changed since the party first gained power, to the 
point that France has prevented some countries in the Western Balkans from proceeding in the 
enlargement process. 
 Germany is an important case from which to observe the effects of the migrant crisis on 
EU enlargement because Germany accepted over one million migrants in 2015 alone and 
Germany continues to be one of the desired destinations for migrants.  In addition to being 
heavily affected by the migrant crisis, a German case is also important because of the recent rise 
in support of the far right, particularly, the German FRP, the Alternative für Deutschland.  This 
rise in support of the Alternative für Deutschland enhances the importance of the German case 
because the German ruling centrist party publicly admits the need to change the party policies to 
retake voters that defected to the far right (“German election: Merkel vows to win back right-
wing voters” 2017).  This case adds to the argument of the paper since, after the electoral 
victories of the German FRP, the ruling centrist party changed direction on numerous policies, 
even become less outwardly supportive of EU enlargement. 
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Chapter 5:  Germany as a Case Study 
 Germany has been the host for large numbers of migrants long before the most recent 
migrant crisis, most notably the labor migrants and the asylum seekers from the Cold War and 
after.  The labor workers are important to note for the German case study because Germany 
recruited foreign workers from a number of countries, which not all European countries elected 
to do.  Germany recruited labor workers from countries such as:  Turkey, Italy, Greece, Spain, 
Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia until 1973 for the purpose of rebuilding the country 
after the Second World War.  Since labor workers were recruited for temporary work, it was not 
expected that the workers would remain in the country but this changed with family reunification 
and the nature of path dependent occurrences.  By 1973, Germany hosted 2.6 million foreign 
workers, 23 percent being Turkish.  In 1973, Germany stopped recruiting foreign workers, but 
because the already present workers were employed in unattractive sectors, employers were 
interested in keeping the foreign workers in Germany (Borkert with Bosswick 2011).  As the 
number of foreign workers in Germany began to rise, the native citizens increasingly portrayed 
the foreign workers in stereotypical and controversial manners.  The foreigners were often 
portrayed as competing with native citizens for the same jobs in the domestic market, putting 
downward pressure on wages and standards, relying on welfare policies of the state, and causing 
the economic downturns (Kaczmarczyk et al 2015).  Despite the large number of foreign workers 
living in Germany, most migrant crises that Germany became involved in, were made up of 
Europeans from either the Balkans or Eastern Europe (Borkert with Bosswick 2011). 
 During the civil war in Yugoslavia, Germany, along with Austria, hosted large numbers 
of the refugees fleeing the war.  In response to the large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers 
in the 1990s, the issue of asylum became politicized with the German government attempting to 
tighten the asylum laws in order to decrease the number of asylum seekers coming to Germany.  
The migrant issue only became politicized in Germany with increasingly restrictive immigration 
laws in response to large numbers of people fleeing to Germany from the Western Balkans 
(Borkert with Bosswick 2011). 
 Although this current migrant crisis is not the first migrant crisis that Germany has 
endured, Germany has been heavily affected by the current migrant crisis, especially after the 
surge in 2015.  Due to Germany being a destination country for many of the migrants for 
different reasons, Germany has more than 1.6 million people who are seeking asylum that have 
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arrived in the country since 2014 (John 2018).  By having over 1.6 million people of different 
background entering the country since 2014, the native German populace will have seen and felt 
this change in demographics with different non-German cultural buildings being raised to 
accommodate the new migrant populace.  In particular, the largely Christian populace would 
have seen the changes in demographics by seeing churches being changed into mosques for the 
predominantly Muslim migrants (“Germany and Immigration” 2018). 
 Similar to Austria and France, in recent years support for the far right, especially the 
German FRP, Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany or AfD) has increased in 
Germany.  The growth in popularity of the AfD has been relatively recent since the party was 
only founded in 2012 as an anti-Euro party.  The party started as a number of supporters of the 
Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union or CDU) broke off 
from the party to protest the CDU’s political shift to the center, especially with Chancellor 
Angela Merkel’s decision to bailout Greece during the Eurozone crisis with German taxpayer 
money.  The founders of the party range from moderate to extreme in terms of the politics of a 
FRP.  Frauke Petry was one of the party’s leaders since its founding and she represented a 
moderate force in the party as a counterbalance to her co-leader of the party, Alexander Gauland 
(Eddy 2017). 
 In 2013, the first federal elections the AfD participated in, the AfD received only 4.7 
percent of the national vote (“Merkel Triumphs in German Elections” 2013).  After the migrant 
crisis surged in 2015, the AfD changed its core issues to benefit from the reactions to the migrant 
crisis.  The AfD gained power relative to, and at the expense of other political parties in 
Germany in the September 2017 federal elections, where the party won 12.6 percent of the 
national vote.  With the 2017 election results, the AfD surpassed the electoral thresholds of 5 
percent of the national vote in Germany for the first time to gain more than 90 seats in the 
national German legislature.  After the elections, the AfD leadership experienced upheaval as 
one of the previous leaders, Frauke Petry, declared herself an independent in the German 
legislature after winning her seat.  Due to the change in party leadership, Alexander Gauland 
became AfD’s new co-leader along with Jorg Meuthen who continued as the party’s other co-
leader (“German election: How right-wing is nationalist AfD?” 2017).  The latest electoral 
results; however, do not demonstrate support for the AfD from a majority of people in Germany 
that would equate to a large amount of political power.  However, by becoming the third largest 
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party in their first federal elections, the party does demonstrate that it has the capacity for 
widespread support.  In addition, given the AfD’s relatively young age as a political party, it 
could be expected to grow in support as it gains experience and recognition.  Even by receiving 
12 percent of the national vote, the AfD demonstrated that it would be able to challenge 
traditional parties like the German CDU/Christian Social Union (CSU) as the AfD gained power 
at the expense of the other German political parties. 
 Since the 2017 federal elections, the AfD also successfully challenged the Bavarian state 
elections in 2018 where the CSU, the CDU’s sister party in the state, lost its absolute majority in 
the state.  The AfD gained 10 percent of the vote in the state, which gave the AfD seats in 15 of 
the 16 German state legislatures (“Massive Losses for Merkel’s Bavaria Ally” 2018).  The 
results of the Bavarian election demonstrate the rise in popularity of the AfD, especially with the 
ongoing migrant crisis. 
 The results of the federal German elections in 2017 and the subsequent state elections 
clearly demonstrate that the rhetoric of the AfD entices voters who previously voted for parties 
such as the CDU.  The AfD attracts voters because of their anti-multiculturalism, anti-euro, and 
anti-immigration rhetoric and policy platforms.  The 2017 AfD manifesto explicitly states the 
AfD’s anti-Euro stance, which calls for the revocation of the Euro through a vote in the German 
parliament and a national referendum should a parliamentary measure be defeated.  Within the 
manifesto, the party calls for additional reforms in the EU.  If the reforms do not occur or are not 
sufficient the AfD would have Germany exit the EU (Petry with Meuthen PROGRAMM für 
Deutschland 2017). 
 In addition to the Euro-sceptic stance, the party’s message of anti-multiculturalism 
presents itself in the manifesto with an entire section titled “German as a Predominant Culture 
instead of Multiculturalism” (Petry with Meuthen PROGRAMM für Deutschland 2017).  The 
section details how German culture should be the predominant culture in Germany.   The 
premise is that without the maintenance of a predominant German culture, the national value 
system would degrade and the survival of social peace would be under threat.  In order to prevent 
this degradation and threat, the AfD calls for the government to focus on preserving German 
culture and identity instead of giving in to multiculturalism (Petry with Meuthen PROGRAMM 
für Deutschland 2017). 
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 The party gained traction and name recognition in Germany because of the party’s stance 
on the immigration issue as Germany opened itself to migrants during the European migrant 
crisis.  Since its founding, the party has evolved from the single issue of being anti-euro, to also 
focus on immigration and Islam, and the party has officially adopted policies against both 
immigration and Islam.  The anti-immigration policies in the AfD manifesto focus on the need to 
decrease overall immigration and the need to change demographics.  The AfD opposes 
immigration because it fears that the immigrants will create “parallel communities.”  The party 
fears these “parallel communities” because of its belief that these communities would not 
integrate into German culture and would clash with German communities (Petry with Meuthen 
PROGRAMM für Deutschland 2017). 
Figure 2 
 Beyond the general anti-immigrant stance that the party has taken in its manifesto, the 
AfD’s members and former members have also spoken out against migrants and refugees.  The  
AfD’s former leader and moderate in the party, Frauke Petry, said, “German border police 
should shoot at refugees entering the country illegally” (Beale 2016 para. 1).  The AfD has 
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gained popularity over these stances, rhetoric surrounding immigration, and the migrant crisis 
because of the negative views German citizens have about immigration from states outside of the 
EU.  Figure 2 displays the percentage of German citizens expressed positive or negative feelings 
toward immigration of people from outside the EU in 2017.  According to Figure 2, around 58 
percent of the interviewees had some form of negative view of immigrants from countries 
outside of the EU (Eurobarometer 2015).  Even by May of 2017, four months before the federal 
elections that saw the AfD gain seats in the national German legislature, around 55 percent of 
interviewees had a negative feeling towards immigration from outside of the EU, which would 
include feelings towards the migrants involved in the migrant crisis (Eurobarometer 2017). 
 Although the AfD is a Euro-sceptic party, which started purely as an anti-Euro party, its 
stance on EU enlargement is couched in ambivalent language.  While the AfD supports a 
referendum on the issue of enlargement, when the party called for the referendum on the Western 
Balkan expansion, the AfD made its position on the topic clear.  One MP of the AfD stated the 
belief that allowing the Western Balkans to join the EU would lead “in the direction of the 
Balkanisation of the EU, which we absolutely do not want to go through without asking our 
people whether they are in favour” (“AfD Demands a Referendum before Further EU 
Enlargement” 2018 para. 2).  The MP’s reference to the “Balkanisation of the EU” is important 
to note as it reflects that this MP, and the party in general, do not view the Balkans as European, 
instead they see them as an “Other.”  By calling for a referendum on the topic, the AfD is also 
trying to prevent the EU enlargement in the Western Balkans since the AfD would not be able to 
stop the process in the national legislature alone, which is currently the only method available.  
By allowing the people to decide, the AfD has a higher chance of preventing the accession of the 
Western Balkans because, according to a standard Eurobarometer in the autumn of 2018, 64 
percent of German interviewees are against further enlargement of the EU (Eurobarometer 
2018). 
 The rise of the AfD continues to affect German politics as the parties continue to readjust 
their stances on several issues, but the party that has the most to lose with the rise of the AfD is 
the ruling party, the CDU. The CDU has been the ruling party of Germany, with Angela Merkel 
as the party leader, from 2005 until 2018, while participating in different coalitions with other 
parties.  Different political groups that participated in the Weimar Republic founded the CDU in 
1945. These groups included the Protestants who were both liberals and conservative, the 
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Catholic Centre Party, and segments of the middle class, among others.  After German 
reunification, the CDU in West Germany merged with the newly created CDU in East Germany.  
The CDU supports policies of a free-market economy, social welfare programs, European 
integration, and conservative social issues.  After a scandal that involved former German 
chancellor Helmut Kohl and several of his deputies, including his chosen successor, Angela 
Merkel became the leader of the CDU party, since she was not touched by the scandal.  Since 
Angela Merkel became party leader, the CDU/CSU voting block has been the ruling party in the 
national German legislature (Conradt 2018).  After worse than expected results in the 2017 
federal elections and further defeats in several state elections, Angela Merkel stepped down as 
party leader of the CDU in 2018 but continues to perform her role as the Chancellor of Germany.  
The CDU elected Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Angela Merkel’s chosen successor, as the new 
party leader at a party conference in December 2018 (“Merkel’s Choice Elected Ruling Party 
Leader” 2018). 
 The motivation for the CDU to shift policies to the right is based on a desire to regain 
supporters who defected to the far right following the federal and state elections in 2017 and 
2018.  In addition, the CDU could be attempting to retain the current supporters of the CDU 
from being enticed by the views of the AfD.  Chancellor Merkel, after the 2017 elections stated, 
“We have started to analyse the voters we lost, especially with regards to those who went on to 
vote for the AfD, we want to get them back by good politics and addressing some of the issues” 
(“Merkel Vows to Win Back Right-Wing Voters” 2017 para. 23).  In addition to concentrating 
the CDU’s efforts on winning the voters back, the CDU could also be targeting the voters who 
supported the AfD in order to eliminate the AfD from the national German legislature, as 
political parties need to pass an electoral threshold in order to keep their seats in the national 
legislature. 
 One policy shift that has occurred since the migrant crisis started is on the topic of 
supporting EU enlargement in the Western Balkans.  In 2014, Merkel openly supported the 
Western Balkans in their attempts to join the EU.  Merkel even started the process by hosting a 
conference on the topic in Berlin where representatives from the EU, several member states, and 
the Western Balkans attended in the hopes of beginning or speeding up the accession process 
(Says 2014).  Four years after pushing for the inclusion of the Western Balkans in the EU, and 
three years into the migrant crisis however, Chancellor Merkel appeared to have distanced 
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herself from the topic without outright rejecting the notion of the Western Balkans joining the 
EU.  Before an EU conference in Sofia on the topic in 2018, the Albanian Prime Minister tried to 
win support for his country to start the accession process in Germany, but Chancellor Merkel did 
not commit herself to supporting or rejecting Albanian accession (Erebara 2018).  Although a 
non-commitment may not appear to be a shift to the right in terms of policy towards EU 
enlargement, the lack of support for Western Balkan accession, four years after openly 
supporting the process, suggests that domestic politics may have played a factor in Chancellor 
Merkel’s decision not to commit German support.  Furthermore, at the conference in Sofia, EU 
leaders pledged support for the region in terms of infrastructure and “connectivity” without 
referencing EU enlargement for the region.  Chancellor Merkel specifically stated, “No progress 
was made on enlargement,” at a summit that was expected to detail the official European plan for 
the region for the year, on a topic that Chancellor Merkel was a champion of before the migrant 
crisis and the rise of the AfD in German politics (Dimitrov 2018 para. 3). 
 The German case study reveals that after the migrant crisis, the AfD gained power in 
German national politics.  Before the migrant crisis, the AfD was only an anti-Euro party.  
However as the migrant crisis became a more prominent issue in Germany, the AfD changed its 
rhetoric to become a vocal critic of Chancellor Merkel’s decision to welcome over one million 
migrants into Germany.  With this change in rhetoric, the AfD became the third largest political 
party in the national legislature during the party’s first national election, which is an indication 
that the AfD has tapped into an issue that is important to many of the German citizens.  After the 
elections, the AfD gained enough popularity and support in national politics for the center right 
party, the CDU, to admit the need to shift their policies to the right to regain the voters lost to the 
AfD in the latest federal elections.  Before the elections, the CDU was a public advocate for EU 
enlargement in the Western Balkans, but after the admission that the party needed to change its 
policies to regain voters, the CDU has stopped being as vocal about the German support for EU 
enlargement in the Western Balkans. 
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Chapter 6:  France as a Case Study 
 Unlike the other two case studies in this paper, France has a history of migration that is 
partly tied to its colonial and overseas history as an empire.  From the end of the Second World 
War until 1973, Algerians were allowed to immigrate to continental France in unregulated 
numbers.  This unregulated migration is still visible today with the large minority population of 
Algerians in France.  The politicization of the immigration topic started earlier in France than the 
other two case studies, especially when Jean-Marie Le Pen began to gain national prominence.  
Due to the politicization of the immigration topic, policies and laws on immigration and 
migration changed with each successive governmental shift between the left and the right.  These 
legal and political shifts meant that successive governments made small changes intended to 
convey to the public that the sitting government was doing something to change the immigration 
trends.  While the shifts were small in nature, France started to criminalize illegal residence in 
the 1990s in an effort to decrease the levels of immigration, which demonstrates that France was 
becoming more strict in terms of immigration policy (de Wenden, 2011). 
 During the recent migrant crisis, France has not been as heavily affected as some of the 
other case studies in this paper.  France is not a transit country for many migrants to travel 
through, nor is France a destination country that migrants try to reach.  In 2015, the migrant 
surge saw roughly 71,000 people apply for asylum in France, as opposed to countries like 
Germany which had 442,000 people apply for asylum (“Record 1.3 Million Sought Asylum in 
Europe in 2015” 2016).  This trend of not having many migrants seek entry continued with 
around 91,070 people applying for asylum in France in 2017, as opposed to Germany’s roughly 
200,000 applications.  In addition to fewer people applying for asylum in France than in other 
countries, France also has one of the lowest rates of migrant retentions when measured in the 
form of acceptance of asylum claims within the EU.  France currently accepts one in three 
asylum applications, while on average the European Union accepts one in two applications 
(Robert 2018).  Due to the large population of France,  combined with the small numbers of 
migrants accepted in France in terms of both applying for asylum and the granting of asylum, 
French people would not have seen as many migrants or shifts of demographics in local areas.  
Thus, the French case study offers a different perspective of how influential the migrant crisis 
may be because France has not been as heavily affected by the crisis as the other two case 
studies. 
33 
 
 Francois Duprat and Francois Brigneau founded the French FRP, the Front National 
(FN), in 1972.  After the party was founded, Jean-Marie Le Pen became its leader until his 
daughter Marine Le Pen succeeded him in 2011.  Originally, the party was associated with the 
fringe far right through comments made by Jean-Marie Le Pen, which were construed as neo-
fascist.  After Marine Le Pen succeeded her father, the party tried to expand and legitimize itself 
as a contender in French national politics outside of being a protest party.  The FN gained 
popularity by distancing itself from previous extreme views, such as denying that the holocaust 
happened, and recasting the issue of immigration as being a threat to France and French culture 
(Ray 2017). 
 In the 2012 presidential election, Marine Le Pen came in third during the first round of 
elections by winning 18 percent of the vote, which was largest percentage the party had ever 
received in a first round of presidential election up to that point.  Subsequent local, national, and 
EU elections after 2012 reflected the continued growing support for the FN (Ray 2017).  The 
2017 presidential elections further demonstrated that support for the FN and their platforms grew 
since Le Pen won 21.4 percent of the first round of voting while contending with five opponents 
(Jones with Clarke 2017).  By winning 21.4 percent of the vote in the first round, Le Pen moved 
on to the run-offs with Emmanuel Macron, only the second time that the FN has moved on to the 
run-off stage of the elections.  In the run-offs, Le Pen gained 33.9 percent share of the vote, the 
highest ever for the FN (Aisch with Bloch, Lai, and Morenne 2017).  After the parliamentary 
elections in 2017, Marine Le Pen rebranded the party as the Rassemblement National (National 
Rally or RN) in an effort to further distance the FRP from the anti-Semitist history of the FN 
(“France’s National Front Leader Marine Le Pen Proposes Rebranding as ‘Rassemblement 
National’” 2018).  In polls for the upcoming European parliamentary elections, it appears that the 
RN could tie in first place for the support that the party receives from the French population 
(Gotev 2018). 
 The FN’s power and popularity noticeably increased under the leadership of Marine Le 
Pen, and improved to the point where the FN was one of two parties to move onto the 
presidential run-off elections.  By continuing to the runoff election, the vote indicates that when 
the FN competed with all of the other political parties, either it received the most or the second 
most votes nation-wide.  The FN motivated the French populace to vote for the party partly 
through their Euro-sceptic, anti-multiculturalism, and “law and order” platforms.  Examples of 
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these policies are stated in the 2017 FN election manifesto which espouses multiple platforms for 
the FN, including the need to take back power and sovereignty from the EU, as well as the need 
to reduce legal immigration to an annual limit of 10,000 “legal” immigrants.  In addition to 
expressing the anti-immigration and anti-EU sentiments characteristic of FRPs, the FN also 
portrays itself as the only true patriotic party that stands for French cohesion.  Le Pen asserted 
that in contrast to the FN, none of the other parties stood for this national and cultural cohesion 
because the opposing parties wanted more immigration and less French cohesion.  This supposed 
disregard for French cohesion could be construed as a disregard of French culture in favor of a 
more threatening global culture (Le Pen 144 Engagements Présidentiels 2017). 
 When speaking directly on the topic of the migrant crisis, Le Pen takes a hard stance 
against both migrants and the proposed EU-wide quota system.  Le Pen echoes the beliefs of the 
2017 FN manifesto that immigrants threaten national cohesion by asserting that an open door 
migration policy would destroy the core values of European nations.  Le Pen specifically claims, 
“There are entire villages in France, which are dominated mostly by migrants that turn them into 
ghettos and are controlled by ghettos” (Dimitrov 2018 para. 13).  These xenophobic comments 
demonstrate both the typical stance of an FRP as well as the continuing effects of the migrant 
crisis  
as these claims were made in 2018, after the numbers of migrants reduced significantly from the 
surge of 2015. 
 The rise in popularity of the FN before and after the 2017 presidential elections coincides 
with the increasingly negative sentiments that French people have with immigrants from outside 
of the EU.  Figure 3 displays the percentage of French citizens who expressed positive or 
negative feelings toward the immigration people from outside the EU in 2014, that is before the 
surge of migrants associated with the migrant crisis.  According to the data presented in Figure 3, 
French people already had a negative view of immigrants from outside of the EU with 57 percent 
of the people surveyed having a negative view of immigrants from outside the EU, ranging from 
fairly negative to very negative (Eurobarometer 2014). 
 While existing views of immigrants from outside the EU could be attributed to recent 
French immigration history, three years after the survey in Figure 3, views on immigrants from 
outside the EU changed in a negative fashion.  Figure 4 displays the percentage of French 
citizens in 2017 who expressed positive or negative feelings toward the immigration of people  
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Figure 3 
from outside the EU.  Figure 4 illustrates that the negative perceptions of immigrants from 
outside of the EU increased by 1 percent from 2014 (Eurobarometer 2017).  While the negative 
sentiments towards non-EU immigrants may not have grown much within the three years of the 
different surveys, the more important statistic is the decrease in the “very positive” sentiments 
towards non-EU immigrants.  Figure 3 shows that in 2014, the French respondents included 6 
percent with “very positive” sentiments (Eurobarometer 2014).  In comparison, Figure 4 in 2017 
shows that only 5 percent support a “very positive” sentiment (Eurobarometer 2017).  While the 
shifts in public opinion are not substantial, it is still important to note that opinions have changed 
in a negative fashion over the course of the migrant crisis  
 Beyond exemplifying the xenophobia and anti-multiculturalism of an FRP, the FN also 
promotes a Euro-sceptic point of view that includes an opposition to further EU enlargement.  At 
the same gathering where Le Pen spoke out against the migrant crisis, she also spoke out against 
EU enlargement in the Western Balkans by stating, “further expansion of the EU was not 
relevant, as her envisaged ‘European alliance of free nations’ would welcome any sovereign state 
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that shared its values” (Dimitrov 2018 para. 19).  By rejecting calls for further enlargement in 
general,  
Figure 4 
and in the Western Balkans specifically, Le Pen appears be attempting to gain the support of the 
French voters who are against further EU enlargement.  The number of people in France who 
oppose further enlargement has slightly decreased since 2015, but the opposition continues to 
remain high.  In 2015, 67 percent of people participating in the Eurobarometer were against 
further EU enlargement (Eurobarometer 2015).  That number decreased slightly by 2018 to 62 
percent of the survey participants being against further EU enlargement, but with such a large 
percentage of people against further EU enlargement, it is not surprising that a Euro-sceptic party 
would attempt to gain the support of people already against EU enlargement (Eurobarometer 
2018). 
 While Le Parti Républicain (The Republican Party) has not controlled either the 
presidency or the national legislature in France during the migrant crisis, it is still important to 
note how this center right party has reacted to the migrant crisis and the rise in popularity of the 
37 
 
FRPs.  In the run-up to the 2017 elections, Les Républicains (the Republicans) elected a new 
president of the party, Laurent Wauquiez, who based his campaign in the party on three themes:  
identity, immigration, and Islam.  The rhetoric of Wauquiez mirrored, to a large extent, the 
rhetoric of Marine Le Pen.  When discussing the topic of identity, Wauquiez spoke of how the 
French identity was under attack by Islam.  Along with this statement and others on the topic of 
the dangers of multiculturalism, this rhetoric exemplifies how the Republican Party has shifted 
towards a far-right approach (“Les Républicains : immigration, Europe, impôts... L’inquiétant 
programme de Wauquiez” 2017). 
 On the specific policy issue of immigration and the migrant crisis, Wauquiez called for 
limits on legal immigration to tens of thousands per year as compared to the much larger 
numbers that France received both legally and illegally through the migrant crisis.  In addition to 
limiting the numbers of legal immigrants, Wauquiez also wanted “France to take back her 
sovereignty” in terms of migration politics, which is an attack on the Schengen zone (“Les 
Républicains : immigration, Europe, impôts... L’inquiétant programme de Wauquiez” 2017 para. 
7).  Beyond the parroting of the FRP approach to immigration and identity, Wauquiez also 
adopted the language of the FN when speaking of the EU by calling for a union of nation-states, 
similar to the FN call for an alliance of free nations.  In addition to the attack on the idea of 
federalism in the EU, Wauquiez also specifically stated that he wanted an end to EU enlargement 
in general (“Les Républicains : immigration, Europe, impôts... L’inquiétant programme de 
Wauquiez” 2017).  The rhetoric of the new leader of the Republicans, along with the changed 
policy proposals in the Republican manifesto, demonstrates that this centrist party has shifted to 
the right in terms of policy and rhetoric after the beginning of the migrant crisis.  This shift 
occurred despite this center right party’s history of previously being pro-EU integration under 
Nicolas Sarkozy (Buchan 2019). 
 The ruling party and sitting president of France both come from the same party in France, 
La République En Marche.  The party was founded in 2016 by the current French president, 
Emmanuel Macron.  President Macron founded the party to “rebuild from below” and embody 
not only a political party filling the political space for a center-left party, but also a citizen 
movement (La République En Marche 2017).  One aspect of the party that fits with the call by 
Macron to “rebuild from below” is that LREM is an anti-establishment party that was opposed to 
the previous political elites (Chwalisz 2018).  While the party fills the space for a center-left 
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party, LREM is also a catchall party that attempts to entice voters from across the political 
spectrum (La République En Marche 2017, Krouwel 2003).  More specifically, the party adheres 
to pro-European, pro-EU, economically liberal policies while also committing itself to social 
protection and standing against the French FRP (Chwalisz 2018).  Emmanuel Macron gained the 
presidency in France following the run-off elections in 2017 against Le Pen.  Since gaining the 
presidency, Macron has changed his movement into an actual party that has gained a majority in 
the French National Assembly (“France election: Macron party set for big parliamentary win” 
2017). 
 After ascending to power in 2017, Macron has put forth a bold program that calls for 
deeper and wider integration in the EU.  During a speech at the Sorbonne where Macron laid out 
his aspirations for the EU, he specifically called for the creation of several EU institutions, such 
as the creation of a finance minister for the Eurozone, a Eurozone budget, and a European 
Intelligence Agency (Briançon 2017).  This speech also included a reference to the Balkans in 
which the French President called on the EU to respect that when the countries of the Western 
Balkans meet the democratic requirements, the EU will open itself to the region: 
“Cette Union, lorsqu’ils respecteront pleinement l’acquis et les exigences 
démocratiques, devra s’ouvrir aux pays des Balkans.  Car notre Union reste 
attractive et son aura est un facteur essential de paix et de stabilité sur notre 
continent.  Ils devront respecter les conditions prévues, mais les arrimer à l’Union 
européenne ainsi repensée, c’est une condition pour qu’ils ne tournent pas le dos à 
l’Europe pour aller ou vers la Russie, ou vers la Turquie, ou vers des puissances 
autoritaires qui ne défendent pas aujourd’hui nos valeurs” (Macron 2017). 
 
(English translation) “When they fully respect the acquis and democratic 
requirements, this EU will have to open itself up to the Balkan countries, because 
our EU is still attractive and its aura is a key factor of peace and stability on our 
continent. They’ll have to respect the conditions stipulated, but securing them to a 
European Union reinvented in this way is a precondition for their not turning their 
backs on Europe and moving towards either Russia or Turkey, or towards 
authoritarian powers that don’t currently uphold our values” (Macron 2017). 
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Macron called for the EU to be willing to accept Balkan nations into the EU because of the risks 
of the region turning to other regional and global actors such as Turkey or Russia.  The risks of 
the region turning to other national actors has not changed since 2017. 
 While the geopolitics surrounding the Western Balkans has not changed, President 
Macron has suffered domestic setbacks in the form of the gilets jaunes (yellow vest) protestors, 
which began in September 2018.  The yellow vest protests started in response to a planned 
increase in the eco-taxes levied on gasoline and diesel.  While the eco-taxes were not a key 
legislative policy for Macron, as they were a holdover from the previous presidency, the protests 
against the eco-taxes are emblematic of the growing opposition against the perceived “political 
class” in France and against Macron specifically.  Since the start of the protests, the yellow vests 
have diversified in terms of what the movement wants from the government and who the 
movement encompasses.  By December of 2018, the protests had been occurring nationally for 
months, disrupting businesses and causing significant damage to urban property.  In response to 
these actions and the longevity of the movement, Macron made concessions to the yellow vests 
in terms of increasing the monthly pension bonus and decreasing certain taxes (Williamson 
2018).  More recently the movement’s aspiration have coalesced into four goals:  “proportional 
representation in parliament, direct democracy through Swiss-style referendums, less European 
integration, and- above all- Macron’s resignation” (De Clercq 2019 para. 5).  These goals 
demonstrate a clear opposition that has formed against Macron and his policies, including his 
policies on EU integration. 
 Although the yellow vest movement does not have any direct connections to the migrant 
crisis, the yellow vests demonstrate that Macron needs to exercise caution in terms of policy 
since there is now an existing movement that has become an opposition movement to Macron, 
his policies, and perhaps his party.  Not only have the yellow vests become a movement in 
opposition to Macron, but political leaders such as Marine Le Pen are also trying to appeal to the 
movement for support for their political parties, such as the RN (De Clercq 2019).  Thus with the 
yellow vests emerging as a movement and possible political party formed in opposition to 
Macron and his policies, Macron could find it necessary to shift policies, including European 
integration policies, to the right to both attract voters lost to the yellow vests and in order to 
prevent the RN from gaining the support of the yellow vests. 
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 As the 2019 European Parliamentary elections draw closer, Macron has changed both his 
rhetoric and the French national policy on the Western Balkans.  The most obvious change 
occurred at the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Sofia in May 2018.  The meeting took place to 
determine if Albania and North Macedonia had met the criteria to begin accession talks.  At the 
end of the meeting, both France and the Netherlands voiced opposition to the two Western 
Balkan nations beginning accession talks for entrance into the EU.  The official reasoning that 
President Macron gave for preventing the two Western Balkan countries from starting the 
official enlargement process is that both countries needed more judicial reforms, to reduce 
corruption and combat organized crime (Baczynska 2018).  By opposing the two countries from 
starting the process, the Netherlands and France demonstrated they could exercise their veto 
power halting any chance of Albania or North Macedonia starting the enlargement process for 
another six months.  Due to the opposition of the French and the Dutch, the EU will allow North 
Macedonia and Albania to start the enlargement process, but only in June 2019, a month after the 
European parliamentary elections (Tregoures 2018).  By delaying the start of the accession 
process for the two countries until after the parliamentary elections, Macron has shifted the 
French national policy to the right by delaying the process in the hope of gaining voters from the 
RN. 
 The French case exemplifies the theory of this paper through the rightward shift of 
Macron’s center left party, LREM.  The theory is exemplified in the French case specifically 
through Macron’s change in policy towards EU enlargement for Albania and North Macedonia 
in the face of European elections that showed polls wherein the RN could beat the LREM in the 
European Parliament.  Moreover, the French case reveals that the French FRP gained power and 
support in the presidential elections as the migrant crisis continued to affect France.  By shifting 
rightward, Macron not only changed his rhetoric from his speech in the Sorbonne, a speech that 
set out many of Macron’s proposed EU policies, but he also actively changed French policy 
towards EU enlargement in the cases of Albania and North Macedonia because of a fear of the 
opposition in France. 
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Chapter 7:  Austria as a Case Study 
 The migrant crisis is not the first time that Austria has experienced an influx of migrants, 
even since the end of the Cold War.  By the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the wars 
in Yugoslavia, Austria was becoming both a transit country and a place of refuge for refugees 
and asylum seekers.  By 2009, the total foreign population in Austria amounted to 10.4 percent 
of the total population, a total of 870,704 people.  By the mid-1980s, migration started to become 
a politicized issue with the Austrian FRP taking the anti-migrant stance in terms of policy 
(Kraler 2011).  The migrant issue became politicized in Austria because the Austrian domestic 
labor market was oversaturated with workers who were both foreigners and native citizens at the 
same time as there was a global economic crisis, 1973 to 1974.  This oversaturation of the labor 
market caused the already present stereotypical views of migrants, such as migrants reducing the 
number of jobs available to native citizens, to become a reality for some Austrian citizens 
(Feichtinger with Cohen 2014).  Due to this increasing politicization of the issue of migration, 
especially around asylum seekers, the Austrian national government tightened its asylum, 
immigration, and migrant laws to reduce number of people traveling to or through Austria from 
1991 to 1992.  This trend in tightening the legislation around the three topics has continued 
throughout the early 2000’s (Kraler 2011). 
 In addition to the foreign workers that were brought into Austria until 1973, Austria also 
saw an increase in foreigners living in Austria between 1989 and 1993 with the number of 
doubling in four years from 384,000 to 699,000 people living in Austria.  This increase in 
foreigners came primarily from Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and others from the “Third 
World.”  Due to the diversity of people coming to Austria, Austrian politics did not begin to 
distinguish between the different groups of people in order to create an “other” instead 
unregistered immigrants, regardless of national origin, became referred to as “illegals” 
(Feichtinger with Cohen 2014). 
 During the surge of 2015, Austria became a transit country for migrants trying to reach 
Germany and Sweden, two countries which had both stated their intent to welcome the migrants 
traveling to Europe.  By becoming a transit country, Austria saw over one million migrants pass 
through the country in the hopes of entering either Germany or Sweden.  While Austria’s main 
role in the migrant crisis was acting as a transit country for the migrants, because of the Dublin 
regulations, Austria also took in many migrants, receiving over 90,000 applications for asylum.  
42 
 
While this number may not appear to be significant compared to the one million migrants that 
travelled to Europe in 2015, 90,000 migrants equates to 1 percent of the Austrian population, 
which would be very noticeable for many Austrian citizens (Bell 2018). 
 Anton Reinthaller founded the Freedom Party of Austria in 1956 as a liberal, anti-clerical 
and pro-German party that was opposed to the domination of the political sphere by the two main 
parties, the ÖVP and Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (the Social Democratic Party of 
Austria or SPÖ).  Until 1986, the party was a liberal party that drew in some former Nazis 
because of its pro-German rhetoric (Solsten 1994).  By 1986, Jörg Haider gained control of the 
party and changed the party to identify as a far-right party that has had scandals of being anti-
Semitic and racist.  The FPÖ first participated in a national government as a junior coalition 
partner with the ÖVP in 2000 and 2003, but the coalitions failed soon after formation, partly 
because the EU sanctioned Austria for allowing the “extremists” into the government (Isenon 
2017).  Many of the current FPÖ members of Parliament, ministers, and staff are members of 
right wing societies that have ties to neo-Nazis.   
 In the most recent special election in 2017, the FPÖ won 26.9 percent of the vote with a 
turnout of 80 percent of eligible voters, around 6.5 million people (Knolle 2018).  In the 2017 
elections, the party came in third behind both centrist parties, with the ÖVP taking 31.5 percent 
of the vote, but the SPÖ did not want to become a junior coalition partner with the ÖVP (Austria 
2017).  Despite the FPÖ being third in terms of support as compared to the two major parties, the 
increased support of the FPÖ from the previous general elections of 2013 demonstrates the 
increasing popularity of the party.  In the 2013 elections, the FPÖ won 21.4 percent of the vote, 
which increased by more than five points in the 2017 elections (“Narrow Win for Austria Ruling 
Bloc” 2013).  It is worth noting that the Austrian FRP experienced a five percent increase in 
support during a period that oversaw the migrant surge of 2015 and the ongoing migrant crisis. 
 The party gained some of those voters by taking a hard stance against immigration and 
illegal migrants from the migrant crisis.  The FPÖ took a tough stance on immigration by placing 
an emphasis on an Austrian identity by stating, “Austria is not a country of immigration” 
(Strache 2011 section 2 para. 6).  The FPÖ further insists that migrants seeking asylum should 
not journey to Austria if they pass through a third country that would be just as safe as Austria 
(Strache 2011).  This essentially calls for migrants to not try to travel to Austria in the hopes of 
asylum when there are safe countries along the journey to Austria. By taking a stance against 
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immigration and placing the emphasis on identity, the FPÖ conforms to the strategies and 
rhetoric of other xenophobic FRPs.  The head of the FPÖ, Heinz-Christian Strache went further 
in espousing the need to maintain an Austrian identity during the migrant crisis by calling for the 
creation of a fence along the border to prevent further migration.  In addition, Strache advocated 
for allowing Christian and Jewish refugees into the countries rather than Muslims and he stated, 
“We don’t want an Islamisation of Europe.  We don’t want our Christian culture to perish” 
(Shields with Nasralla 2015 para. 7). 
Figure 5 
 The FPÖ used the anti-immigration and anti-migrant stance to entice voters after the 
migrant crisis, which correlates with a spike in anti-immigrant sentiments in Austria.  Figure 5 
displays the percentage of Austrian citizens in 2014, who expressed positive or negative feelings 
about immigration of people from outside the EU.  In 2014, right before the migrant crisis surge 
in 2015, about 35 percent of the population had positive feelings about immigration from states 
outside of the EU and 56 percent had a negative view of immigration (Eurobarometer 2014).  
Figure 6 displays the percentage of Austrian citizen in 2017 who expressed positive or negative 
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feelings about immigration of people from outside the EU.  In Figure 6, a survey taken before the 
2017 elections, the Austrian people who participated showed that there are more people with 
strong negative feelings towards immigration and a similar amount of people who still view 
immigration from outside the EU in a “Fairly Negative” manner.  The number of people who 
responded as “Don’t Know” and “Very Positive” also decreased in the second survey 
(Eurobarometer 2017).  While there may not appear to be a large difference between the two 
surveys, the migrant crisis, which started in 2013, changed views to become stronger in their 
negativity or caused more people to rethink their strong positive opinions about immigration.    
Figure 6 
 Along with exemplifying the xenophobia and anti-multiculturalism of the FRPs, the FPÖ 
also exemplifies the Euro-sceptic point of view in regards to the EU in general by advocating for 
“the basic constitutional principles of sovereign Member States must have absolute priority over 
Community law” (Strache 2011 section 10 para. 5).  The FPÖ is also a member of the EU party, 
the Europe of Nations and Freedom, which is a group of Euro-sceptic parties from across 
Europe, including the FN and AfD. 
 The FPÖ position on EU enlargement is not specific, but the party is likely against EU 
enlargement as the party is a self-acclaimed Euro-sceptic party.  While the party position is not 
clear, the rhetoric of the party leader after joining the Austrian government supports the belief 
that the FPÖ is against EU enlargement in the Western Balkans.  The party leader, Strache, 
commented that the Serb portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina should have the right to become 
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independent.  If the Serb portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina is allowed to become independent, as 
the comment showed a desire for, the EU enlargement process for the region could be put in 
danger as the current process does not foresee or allow for geopolitical changes in the Western 
Balkans that could destabilize the entire region (Mischke 2018). 
 The party is also presumptively against further EU enlargement in order to entice the 
substantial number of people who are anti-enlargement in Austria.  In 2015, the Eurobarometer 
survey found that 75 percent of Austrians who participated were against further EU enlargement 
(Eurobarometer 2015).  While the number of people who oppose future EU enlargement has 
decreased to 58 percent of the interviewees by 2018, the number is still larger than the European 
average and represents a sizeable number of people who would most likely support a Euro-
sceptic party (Eurobarometer 2018). 
 The Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) was founded in 1945 by distinguishing itself from its 
predecessor the Christian Social Party by supporting the Austrian nation and parliamentary 
democracy.  The party is a Christian Democratic Party that represents a wide variety of groups 
including business owners, working people, farmers, tradespeople, populists and seniors (Roider 
et al. 2019).  The party is one of two parties that has controlled politics in Austria since the end 
of the Second World War.  The ÖVP was also the party that pushed for Austrian accession into 
the EU in 1995.  After the last coalition government with the SPÖ failed, the ÖVP began having 
problems uniting the different groups that the party historically has represented.  Eventually the 
ÖVP chose Sebastian Kurz to lead the newly revamped party in the special elections of 2017 
(Die neue Volkspartei 2019). 
 Under Sebastian Kurz, the new ÖVP has shifted to the right, especially in policies 
regarding immigration.  In the 2017 party manifesto, the ÖVP parrots the FPÖ in its emphasis on 
an Austrian identity based on religious and linguistic boundaries.  The ÖVP specifically 
emphasizes the German language in any integration process that could potentially lead to 
citizenship.  In addition to the emphasis on the German language, the party also attacks Islamic 
schools by calling for stronger control and possible closure if they do not meet legal 
requirements.  The ÖVP parrots the FPÖ anti-Islam stance by specifically targeting Islamic 
schools without naming other possible private schools.  The ÖVP, in its manifesto, advocates for 
a new migration strategy that does not emphasize the need to help the migrants seeking asylum 
in Austria, instead it calls for the government to combat the reasons behind the migrant crisis.  In 
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the same paragraph that calls for a new migration strategy, the ÖVP also promotes “a more 
effective return policy,” which demonstrates the desire to have the migrants eventually leave 
Austria for their home countries (Kurz 2017 p. 4).  Kurz himself has also taken a stance against 
the migrants in the run-up to the 2017 election by saying, “Those who attempt to come to Europe 
illegally, should lose the right to claim asylum in Europe” (Traill 2017 section 4 para. 8).  By 
saying this, Kurz effectively called for the deportation of any migrant who came to Europe 
during the crisis because the vast majority did not follow the legal process, especially as the legal 
process applied to the Dublin Regulations. 
 While the ÖVP appears to have parroted aspects of the FPÖ manifesto, especially in 
regards to immigration, the ÖVP did not parrot the FPÖ policy regarding EU enlargement.  In 
contrast to the proposed immigration policy, the ÖVP endorsed EU enlargement, especially the 
Western Balkans, which are mentioned specifically (Kurz Regierungsprogramm 2017).  Part of 
the reasoning for this lies in the ÖVP’s commitment to maintaining stability in the Western 
Balkans, which has been encouraged by the accession process.  The ÖVP believes that stability 
will bring more security and improvement in economic conditions in the Western Balkans that 
Austria can profit from (Balfour with Stratulat 2015).  Even with the continued support of the 
ÖVP for EU enlargement in the Western Balkans, the government has not commented on 
possible future enlargement either in the East or in the Southern Caucuses, of which both regions 
also have agreements with the EU that could lead to accession talks. 
 By winning 26.9 percent of the vote in 2017, the FPÖ demonstrated that it both 
represented a large proportion of eligible Austrian voters and that it was a viable candidate to 
join a government in a coalition.  The ÖVP, after parroting the immigration platform of the FPÖ, 
agreed to join in a coalition government with the FPÖ.  Within the coalition agreement, the ÖVP 
retains control over eight cabinet positions while giving the FPÖ seven positions.  Of the seven 
positions given to the FPÖ, the positions include:  interior minister, defense minister, health 
minister, and social security minister.  In addition to these positions, the FPÖ also nominated a 
person for the foreign minister position.  Even though the ÖVP gave the FPÖ the foreign 
minister position, Kurz moved the responsibilities for the EU to the chancellery so that he would 
retain control of Austria’s relations and policy towards the EU (Karnitschnig 2017). 
 The Austrian case study does not indicate any correlation or causation between the 
migrant crisis and national policies towards EU enlargement.  Although this case study does not 
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help to support the argument of the paper, the case study does support the correlation between 
the migrant crisis and a rise in power of the FRPs.  In addition, the Austrian case study 
demonstrates that centrist governments are willing to parrot certain policy platforms of the far 
right in the hopes of eventually forming a coalition government.  One possibility that could 
explain why the Austrian case study does not support the theory is that the theory does not take 
into account the economic and historic ties that a country may have with prospective EU 
enlargement candidates, especially in the Western Balkans.  This line of explanation fits with the 
first alternative theory proposed in the research design because the Austrian economy could 
benefit from the Western Balkans becoming member states of the EU, just as the Austrian 
economy did during the EU enlargements in Central and Eastern Europe (Balfour with Stratulat, 
2015).  Another alternative, which partially agrees with the theory of this paper, follows the logic 
that since the ÖVP is already in coalition with the FPÖ, the ÖVP does not need to parrot further 
policies of the FPÖ to steal voters.  In addition, since the FPÖ placed so much emphasis on the 
issue of immigration and migration, it would be more likely that the FPÖ would focus its 
interests on the issue of migration and not on EU enlargement, which could be left to the 
nominally pro-EU ÖVP. 
 One can see from the different possible theories which explain how the migrant crisis has 
affected EU enlargement that there are limitations specific to the Austrian case study.  The main 
limitation for the Austrian case study is that the national government does not have a specific 
policy towards EU enlargement, nor has the government come out in support of or against EU 
enlargement in general.  Instead, the Austrian government has only shown support for the 
accession of the Western Balkan states, without commenting on the other enlargement 
candidates in Eastern Europe, such as Ukraine or Georgia.  Due to this limitation, this paper 
cannot draw a conclusion on Austria’s position on EU enlargement or any possibilities that its 
policy has changed. 
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Chapter 8:  Conclusion 
 The three case studies first demonstrate that the migrant crisis has increased the 
popularity and electoral support of the FRPs who stand against the migrants and immigration in 
general.  By examining both the electoral success of the FRPs and public opinion toward 
immigrants from outside the EU, one can see that the migrant crisis has increased the support 
and power of the FRPs in the national setting.  This increase in support and power of the FRPs 
has led to the ruling centrist parties in all three case studies to shift some of the country’s 
national and EU policies to the right in the hopes of retaining or regaining voters from the FRPs. 
 Beyond the changes that occurred in the national settings, the migrant crisis also 
influenced the politics of the European Union.  The French and German case studies show how 
the change in their national politics caused both member states to change either their rhetoric or 
policies towards EU enlargement.  In the case of the Western Balkans, the German CDU has 
lessened its public support for EU enlargement to the Western Balkans and has not commented 
on possible further expansion outside of the Western Balkans.  France has taken a more drastic 
step by preventing two of the Western Balkan states from beginning the accession process.  Both 
actions have been carried out in the hopes of retaining or regaining voters in the national context. 
 The scholarly implications raised by this research are that it applies EU integration theory 
to the migrant crisis, a subject to which EU integration theory had previously not been applied.  
This research also adds nuance to the politics of EU enlargement by demonstrating that external 
crises and national politics can affect the process of EU enlargement, either as an ongoing 
process or the beginning of the process.  The research also demonstrates that there is space for 
future research in several areas, including the effects that FRPs have on other EU policies, how 
FRPs affect national politics, and how external crises can influence the EU.  This paper also 
provides one of the first postfunctionalist perspectives on the migrant crisis in Europe by 
demonstrating that EU enlargement politics have become politicized to such an extent that 
centrist parties are willing to shift to the right or even parrot the policies of the FRPs. 
 The policy implications for this paper are relatively simple as this paper demonstrates 
how the issue of EU enlargement, and other EU policies requiring unanimity, can be hijacked by 
the national politics of a single member state.  While not all EU policies require unanimity, EU 
enlargement and the common foreign and security policy are two examples that do require 
unanimity from member states.  Thus, this research demonstrates the need for the EU to be 
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reformed by instituting measures which would prevent a single member state from being able to 
stop the enlargement process for long periods of time or for domestic benefits.  One option 
would be to remove the necessity for unanimity in EU enlargement, the EU decreases the chance 
that an FRP would be able to derail EU policies themselves or through centrist parties in power 
who parrot the policies of the FRPs.  While this is not a perfect solution since there would be a 
possibility that member states already adopting anti-EU integration policies would attempt to 
leave the EU, which Brexit has already demonstrated is possible.  The other policy implication 
that this research offers is by reinforcing the need for EU member states to work in concert with 
one another on issues such as the migrants or border control, especially in times of external 
crises.  Member states need to work together on issues such as the migrant crisis because this 
research offers a perspective of how countries more heavily affected by the migrant crisis are 
more likely to see a rise in the support of an FRP. 
 While there are many implications from this research, both politically and scholarly, there 
are still several limitations to the research of this paper.  The first limitation is that this paper was 
only able to use three case studies of the 28 member states, which does not sufficiently explain 
the effects of the migrant crisis on the national politics of every member state.  A second 
limitation of this paper is that it focuses on EU enlargement in relation to the Western Balkans 
with only a brief mention of rhetoric against EU enlargement outside of the Western Balkans.  
Despite these limitations, this paper advances the discussion of how the migration has affected 
EU politics, specifically the national politics surrounding EU enlargement, which had not 
previously been touched upon in other research. 
 While this paper was able to examine three different member states in the EU, the EU 
compromises 28 countries which all have unique national politics.  Thus, one avenue for further 
research would be to investigate the national politics and EU enlargement policies of each of the 
28 member states.  By investigating the national politics and policies towards EU enlargement, 
this further research will be able to understand if, and if so how, the migrant crisis has affected 
each country. 
 In addition to further research examining other EU member states, further research could 
also examine the entirety of party politics in EU member states including the differences within 
coalition governments.  It would be important to note how politics, even in left or far left parties, 
have been affected by the migrant crisis and the rising popularity of the far right since Greece is 
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one example of a far left party being in power during the migrant crisis.  This further research 
could investigate how different coalitional makeups affect how centrist parties respond to FRPs.  
Different coalitions would be important to investigate, even in the cases outlined in this paper 
because there could be a wide degree of variability between the different responses of centrist 
governments. 
 An alternative approach to further research on the topic of the effect of the migrant crisis 
on the EU would be to investigate other European policies.  The more easily proven aspect of 
this further research would look at the other EU policies that require unanimity from the national 
leaders of the member states, such as enlargement.  This research would not necessarily need to 
be limited to only analyzing the EU policies that require unanimity though, as it could still be 
possible to find correlations in the policies that do not require unanimity from the member states. 
 One final approach to further research could be taken in the context of the migrant crisis 
itself.  Instead of focusing on the EU, further research could investigate the effects that migrant 
crises have had on national politics in other supranational or intergovernmental organizations, 
such as the United Nations or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.  By investigating 
migration in the context of other organizations, this further research could identify if the reaction 
to the migrant crisis within the EU is unique or a larger phenomenon that could affect other parts 
of the world beyond Europe. 
 If the EU is to survive as a viable singular political unit, the member states will need to 
act in concert to address the migrant crisis and its effects, or else a larger burden will be placed 
on specific member states such as Italy or Greece, which are the first EU member states that 
migrants arrive in.  To quote United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, “As the 
world’s problems grow, multilateralism represents [the] best path to meet the challenges that lie 
ahead” (“Multilateralism: The only path to address the world’s troubles, signals Guterres” 2018 
para. 1). 
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